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EMI DTG : 87050700490540  
RTTUZYUW RUEKJCS0198 1270051-UUUU--RUEALGX.  
ZNR UUUUU  
R 070051Z MAY 87  
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI  
RUEALGX/SAFE  
R 062322Z MAY 87  
FM FBIS WASHINGTON DC  
TO RUYLSD/NAVSECGRUACT HANZA JA  
RUCLAKA/ CDR9THPSYOPBN FT BRAGG NC//AFVS-POG-N-SSN//  
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA  
RAYWYB/JIO CANBERRA AS  
RUFHIN/AMEMBASSY BONN//GROBEL & EDGAR OCA//  
RUDOMKE/FBIS LONDON UK  
RUDKFV/FBIS VIENNA AU  
RUHJFBA/FBIS OKINAWA JA  
RUEHMY/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC//IEG EXEC OFF//  
RUEAIDF/OD&E FIELD OFFICE WASHINGTON DC  
RUSNNOR/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//  
RUFHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
RUDOMKB/FBIS LONDON UK//BBC//  
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON//ATTN MCCORMACK, CARY//  
RUDKSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
RUDKDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE  
RUEKJCS/DEFINTAGENCY WASH DC  
RUEBHAA/STORAGE CENTER FBIS WASHINGTON DC  
RUWTHNOA/USSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO//POLAD//  
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA AU//PAA//  
RHHMRARA/6922 ESS CLARK AB RP  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI  
RUEHND/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
ACCT FBWA-EWDK

BT

EZ1:

UNCLAS LD PMU

EZ2:

MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

ATTN BBC PARTS 1 AND 4

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SUBJ

FBIS TRENDS -- 6 MAY 87 -- USSR-AFGHANISTAN  
WA062218

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE MEDIA ANALYSIS

MOSCOW EVINCES PESSIMISM ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PLAN  
SUMMARY

- <> PESSIMISTIC SOVIET REPORTING ON THE PROGRESS OF <><>AFGHANISTAN<><>'S  
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROGRAM, TOGETHER WITH PUBLICITY FOR RAIDS  
<> BY <><>AFGHAN<><> RESISTANCE FORCES INTO SOVIET TERRITORY, SUGGESTS MOSCOW  
<> SEEKS TO JUSTIFY A LONGTERM MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN <><>AFGHANISTAN<><>.

- - - - -

MOSCOW FIRST SIGNALLED ITS GLOOMIER APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL  
RECONCILIATION EFFORT IN A SUMMARY OF REMARKS RECENTLY MADE BY

- <> <><>AFGHAN<><> LEADER NAJIB IN <><>KABUL<><> (PRAVDA, 20 APRIL). ON THIS  
<> OCCASION,

NAJIB ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PROGRESS OF THE RECONCILIATION ATTEMPT  
"CANNOT YET BE REGARDED AS SMOOTH" AND ADMITTED THAT "THERE HAS YET  
TO BE A RADICAL TURNABOUT IN THE SITUATION" AT LEAST IN PART DUE TO  
THE "INSUFFICIENT" EFFORTS OF THE "PARTY AND GOVERNMENT." HE ALSO  
SAID THAT THE "MAIN RESULT" OF EFFORTS TO THAT POINT WAS ONLY THAT  
THE "PEOPLE'S MOOD HAS CHANGED" AND THAT THE PEOPLE MORE FULLY  
SUPPORTED NATIONAL RECONCILIATION THAN ANY PREVIOUS "PARTY SLOGAN."

SOVIET REPORTS QUICKLY BEGAN TO ECHO NAJIB'S PESSIMISM:

-- AT A PRESS BRIEFING REPORTED BY IZVESTIYA ON 22 APRIL, CHIEF  
FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN GENNADIY GERASIMOV REITERATED THAT "A  
RADICAL TURNING POINT" HAD "STILL NOT BEEN ACHIEVED" DUE TO  
"TOUGHENING RESISTANCE" FROM "ARMED GROUPINGS, SUPPORTED FROM  
ABROAD."

- <> -- IN A 21 APRIL BROADCAST, MOSCOW RADIO'S <><>KABUL<><> CORRESPONDENT,  
BORIS SAVODYAN, OBSERVED THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE AN "UNAMBIGUOUS  
ASSESSMENT" OF THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROGRAM, NOTING THAT  
THERE HAD "SO FAR BEEN NO RADICAL TURNABOUT" IN THE SITUATION.

-- VLADILEN BAYKOV WROTE IN A 26 APRIL PRAVDA ARTICLE TITLED "THE  
DIFFICULT PATH OF RECONCILIATION" THAT THE RECONCILIATION POLICY HAD  
"STILL NOT BROKEN OLD PREJUDICES" AND HAD "FAILED TO FIND PROPER  
UNDERSTANDING" AMONG THOSE "HOSTILE" TO THE REGIME, FOR WHICH HE  
BLAMED THE RESISTANCE FORCES AND THEIR "WESTERN PATRONS."

THE RECENT TURN TOWARD MORE PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENTS OF THE  
RECONCILIATION PROGRAM'S ACHIEVEMENTS DEPARTS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM  
EARLIER APPRAISALS, WHICH OCCASIONALLY TOOK NOTE OF THE DIFFICULTIES  
ENCOUNTERED IN IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN BUT CONSISTENTLY OFFERED UPBEAT  
APPRAISALS OF THE PLAN'S OVERALL PROSPECTS. ONE SUCH REPORT WAS

- <> PRESENTED BY SOVIET TELEVISION'S <><>KABUL<><> CORRESPONDENT, MIKHAIL  
LESHCHINSKIY, WHO ASSURED VIEWERS THAT, DESPITE "TERRORIST ACTS" BY  
<> THE INSURGENTS, THE <><>AFGHAN<><> LEADERSHIP WAS "COOLLY AND SMOOTHLY"  
CARRYING OUT ITS PLANS, WHICH WERE BEING "APPROVED BY THE VAST  
<> MAJORITY OF <><>AFGHANS<><> IN THE COUNTRY AND ABROAD" (SOVIET TELEVISION,  
15 FEBRUARY).

MOSCOW'S HEIGHTENED PESSIMISM ABOUT THE NEAR TERM -- IT CONTINUES

[REDACTED]

TO PRAISE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION'S LONG TERM BENEFITS -- MAY REFLECT FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON ANY OF ITS THREE MAIN ELEMENTS -- REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES, NEGOTIATIONS TO FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT OF "NATIONAL UNITY," AND A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE. SOVIET MEDIA HAVE REPORTED UNABATED FIGHTING, INCLUDING ATTACKS ON SOVIET TERRITORY, AND A SLOW REPATRIATION RATE, ONE THAT WOULD REQUIRE DECADES FOR THE COMPLETE RETURN OF THE <><>AFGHAN<><> EMIGRE POPULATION. MOSCOW HAS ALSO BEEN UNABLE TO ANNOUNCE THE <><>KABUL<><> REGIME'S SUCCESS IN ATTRACTING A SINGLE NOTEWORTHY OPPOSITION FIGURE TO NEGOTIATIONS ON A COALITION.

#### RAIDS ON SOVIET TERRITORY

THE PESSIMISM NOW BEING PROJECTED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN <><>AFGHANISTAN<><>, COMBINED WITH THE ABSENCE OF A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE <><>AFGHAN-PAKISTANI<><> PROXIMITY TALKS, MAY ALSO ACCOUNT FOR MOSCOW'S PUBLICITY FOR RAIDS ACROSS THE SOVIET BORDER BY <><>AFGHAN<><> RESISTANCE FIGHTERS. AFTER BELATEDLY REPORTING THE CROSS-BORDER SHELLING OF A SOVIET VILLAGE IN MID-MARCH, SOVIET MEDIA HAVE PUBLICIZED AN APPARENTLY MORE SERIOUS ATTACK ON 8 APRIL IN WHICH INSURGENTS CROSSED THE BORDER INTO SOVIET TERRITORY AND KILLED TWO BORDER GUARDS. MOSCOW'S DECISION TO REPORT THE ATTACK SEEMED INTENDED TO UNDERSCORE THE LEGITIMACY OF ITS LONGSTANDING CLAIM THAT ITS INTERVENTION IN <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT ITS SOUTHERN BORDER. IZVESTIYA (22 APRIL) AND KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (23 APRIL) PUBLISHED PARTICULARLY VIVID ACCOUNTS OF THE 8 APRIL ATTACK, WITH IZVESTIYA COMMENTING THAT THE RESISTANCE "DECIDED TO MOUNT A BANDIT OPERATION IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET BORDER." BOTH ACCOUNTS STRESSED THAT THE INSURGENTS WERE VIRTUALLY ANNIHILATED BY FIERCE SOVIET REPRISALS, AND THE MILITARY DAILY PLACED PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE HEROISM OF THE BORDER UNITS PITTED AGAINST "THE BARBARIC ACTION OF THE DUSHMANS AND THEIR OVERSEAS MOTIVATORS."

AT THE SAME TIME, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE KGB BORDER GUARDS WAS CALLED INTO QUESTION DURING A HIGHLY UNUSUAL VISIT OF POLITBURO MEMBER VIKTOR CHEBRIKOV, WHO HEADS THE KGB, TO THE BORDER AREAS THAT HAD BEEN THE TARGET OF THE ATTACKS. CHEBRIKOV WAS REPORTED BY TASS (PRAVDA, 1 MAY) TO HAVE PAID "PARTICULAR ATTENTION" DURING HIS TRIP NOT ONLY TO "QUESTIONS OF ENSURING THE SECURITY OF THE USSR'S STATE BORDERS" BUT ALSO TO "ENHANCING THE MILITARY SKILL" OF THE BORDER GUARDS -- SUGGESTING THAT HE WAS LESS THAN COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT THEIR PERFORMANCE DURING THE RECENT INCIDENT. (ENDALL) AG

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